Showing posts with label Metaphysics of Law. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Metaphysics of Law. Show all posts

Sunday, March 27, 2016

Definition of Law: "the will of the legislator solemnly expressed"

This is the very first fragment and primeval draft of what would evolve over the following two years into my bachelor’s thesis. It was composed on 25 March 2013, just hours after I had submitted my associate’s degree essay, and was originally entitled De Lege Regulaque.[1] The definition of law as argued for—the will of the legislator solemnly expressed—was inspired by Art. 2 of the Louisiana Civil Code: “Legislation is a solemn expression of legislative will.”
 
I. Whether Law Derives from the Will?
Law derives from the will, for it is “made by him who has care of the community”.[2] The act of making anything derives from the will of the maker, for without the choice to make, the made thing would not have been made. Law is a made thing. Therefore it is made by a maker, and would not have been made had the maker not made a choice to make the law. Therefore law derives from the will.
II. Whether Law is the Will of the Legislator?
Law can be nothing other than the will of the one entrusted with the power of making the law, for if it were the will of someone other than he who has the authority to make law, then it would not be a law at all, but a reasonable directive without he morally-binding force of law. Therefore law is the will of him who has been granted the power to make law, commonly referred to as Legislator.
It should be noted that “will” in this context does not denote a faculty of the soul, but the intention of the legislator.
III. Whether the Will of the Legislator is always Just?
Objection—It would seem that the will of the legislator is not always just, for many legislators issue unjust ordinances. Therefore, if law is the will of the legislator, then laws may be just or unjust according to the particular will of the legislator. But unjust laws are not laws at all. Therefore law cannot be thought of as the will of the legislator, for such definition confers upon unjust ordinances the character of law.
Response—The will of the legislator is only the will of the legislator qua legislator insofar as it accords with right reason and the common good. It contradicts right reason to command obedience without promulgation of the command. Therefore the will of the legislator qua legislator demands promulgation as well. The legislator ceases to be a legislator insofar as his will qua legislator goes against the necessary conditions for a just law as enumerated above. Therefore the will of the legislator is not infinite, but is limited by objective morality and right reason. Thus the definition of law qua “will of the legislator” does not lead toward an authoritarian view of law in which the law has the legal character simply because it is the will of the legislator. Therefore the legal character can never be conferred upon law, and law may be defined, at least in part, as the will of the legislator.
IV. Whether Law is Solemnly Expressed?
Law is nothing other than a solemn expression, for if it were a casual expression, it would not be in accordance with the majesty of law and the elevated nature proper to law. Furthermore, if it were not a solemn expression, it would not be properly promulgated to all those upon whom it enjoins, and thus would lack the character of law, since that which has not been communicated cannot be expected to obeyed, and law by its nature has the property of commanding obedience.
V. Whether Custom is Solemnly Expressed?
Solemn expression includes custom, for the people upon which a custom binds and from which such custom derives, through its collective will and common acceptance of a practice, solemnly expresses its will by the common acceptance itself.
VI. Definition of Law
Therefore law is nothing other than the will of the legislator solemnly expressed.



[1] A title I later abandoned because I realised that the Latin usage of regula was incorrect.
[2] Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiæ Ia-IIæ q.90 a.4

Sunday, September 13, 2015

Whether Law is an Act of Love?

I recently rediscovered a fragment from what appears to be an extension of the earliest draft of my thesis (c. 8 May 2013-25 December 2013, or 29 March 2014, 11:30 PM [the various word document drafts are unclear regarding the date of composition]), a fragment which did not end up evolving into the final argument, but a concept with which I still firmly agree. That first thesis draft was written in the style of a Thomistic quæstio since it was on Aquinas' Treatise on Law; hence the "Whether...?", "It would seem that...", "Objection", "I say that—", and "Reply".
 
Whether Law is an Act of Love?
 
It would seem that law is not an act of love—
 
Objection. Law issues certain restraints and requirements, and love does not restrain or require anything. Therefore law cannot be an act of love.
 
I say that—
 
Love is an act of willing the good of the beloved. The good of the beloved is often achieved by forbidding morally-illicit actions or by requiring morally-good or morally-permitted actions. Therefore forbidding or requiring can be aimed at the good of the beloved. But love is nothing other than willing, or aiming at, the good of the beloved. Therefore the acts of forbidding or requiring, which both belong properly to law, can be acts of love. All just laws are aimed at the good of the beloved, for the beloved of the legislator is the community of persons over which he has been appointed governor. Therefore every law is an act of love, for law is nothing other than the legislator willing the good of his beloved, the community for which he legislates.
 
Reply. This [is] a faulty conception of love. Although this may have been true before the fall of man, in a postlapsarian world it is often necessary for love to require or forbid, for the ability to stray is ever present in a fallen world. Therefore, etc.

Monday, June 15, 2015

Contract as Particular Law

A valid contract even has the status of a particular law among the contractors.[1] The contractors form a community ordered to a common end, the well-being and benefit of all involved in the contract. The members of the contractual community give their unanimous consent to the contract, and it thus has the legal character. For it is the will of the legislator, in this case the entire contractual community, solemnly expressed by means of the contractors formulation of the contract, it aims at the good of the entire contractual community over which it enjoins, and it is in accord with justice and reason insofar as it is a valid contract, for validity requires that it be in accordance with divine and natural law ad normam CLIF 12 §204, and if a statute does not violate these, it must needs be just. Therefore, since the contractors form a community, the whole people of such community has the right to make law for themselves, and this legislative right is properly exercised by means of contract, which thereby has the status of a particular law among the contractors.

(written circa April 2013)

[1] Post inspired by Lon L. Fuller, Anatomy of the Law
Cf. CLIF 12 §2

Wednesday, June 10, 2015

A Common Misstep of the Common Law

A judge is a servant of the law and not its master. The role of a judge is to apply the law in particular cases; the role of the Legislator is to create law for universal governance. The letter of the law is an expression of the spirit of the law, which is the intention of the Legislator. Thusly, although law is a composite of letter and spirit, the law is truly found in the spirit, which is known most directly by the Legislator. Therefore the authentic interpretation of the law is reserved to the Legislator, who knows to the fullest extent the spirit of the law, the most essential element of law of which the letter of the law is an expression (cf. CLIF 52 §101.2).

Saturday, December 27, 2014

On Law, Order, and External Force

It is in the very internal logic of Western legal thought that the mere written word has no actual force in itself. Hence the need for a tribunal to apply the general principle to particular cases and the police to physically enforce such abstract judgment. This enforcement mechanism is what orders Western society.

Yes, it would be ideal if citizens simply followed the clear meaning of the law—assuming the law could be clearly understood (a separate juridical problem). But the fact that citizens do not does not thereby necessitate law being reduced to mere force.
Law is an ordering to the good, be it the common good, the individual good, the last end of man, etc. Law by its nature is an ordering of persons in the jurisdiction of the law (society). But the law can only order if it is effectively enforced. Consequently, in the non-ideal situation of not-wholly-voluntary obedience to the law, the very external force behind a law is the order which the law denotes, since only though external enforcement can the law be effectively implemented and order to the good.
This post was inspired by the writings of Chief Luther Standing Bear and is derivative of an original work from 12 September 2014.

Friday, December 26, 2014

The Injunctive, Practical, and Metaphysical Power of Customary and Statutory Law

By the very fact of its written-ness statutory law is weaker than customary law in its injunctive power. For the written law is necessarily external to the individual (positive law), while the customary, unwritten law is in some sense internal to the individual (i.e. human law analogous to natural law, since natural law is in the very nature of the human person). Due to its internal residency, unwritten law is stronger than external, written positive law.

Now this is certainly true on the practical level in cultures with only unwritten law. But unwritten law has less practical force in Western law due to its indefiniteness as to its exact provisions. The enforcement of customary law in a courtroom poses problems and leaves far too much interpretive power  (and possibility for abuse) in the hands of the judge.

With the Western mindset of exactitude and external enforcement, written law has more practical force. With the mindset of personal obedience, unwritten  law has equal practical force to written law in the West. Metaphysically, unwritten law has more force, since it is the spirit of the law and not its letter which has the morally-binding force, and unwritten law is internalized in man in a manner analogous to the natural law residing in the very nature of the human person.

This post was inspired by the writings of Luther Standing Bear, a chief of the Lakota. 12 September 2014.

Thursday, August 21, 2014

The Ontologically-False "Separation of Powers"

The term “legislative power” properly denotes the power to validly issue laws, to authentically interpret such laws, to apply their authentic and general meaning to particular cases before tribunals, and to implement and enforce such laws by prudent and legal means in accordance with the directives of such laws.
 
The modern error of the “separation of powers” is based upon the notion that the legislative, executive, and judicial powers are separable, but this does not correspond to the nature of the legislative power. I do not here argue for a centralized absolutism in practice, but from the separation of powers qua political fact it is unjustifiable to thereby attribute ontological truth to such separation.

The executive is a nebulous notion of governmental left-overs, encompassing all that which does not fit neatly under the “legislative” and “judicial” wings of government. This office is theoretically the ‘executor’ of the law’s spirit, but, since law is the means by which the authority in a community makes his will known to those outside himself, the “executive” power is really an exercise of the sovereign legislative power. Therefore the “executive” power is really inseparable from the legislative power, and is encompassed by the latter.

“It is emphatically the province and duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases must, of necessity, expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the Courts must decide on the operation of each.”[1]
Although the Common Law errs in applying an interpretation in a particular case to all cases, the principle is sound, that the “judicial” power is essentially legislatively interpretive. Since the “judicial” power is the interpretation of the law for particular cases and the application of such interpretation, it is essentially an exercise in the legislative power, since the law is meant to bind particular cases and the enforcement of the law is an enforcement of the will of the legislator, which is itself the spirit of and truest law. Therefore the “judicial” power is the enforcement of the will of the legislator in particular cases, and is therefore inseparable from the legislative power.

Therefore both the “executive” and “judicial” power are encompassed by the true and authentic meaning of “legislative power”. Only a "unification of powers" is ontologically true, although a "separation of powers" is possible as a legal fiction of political organization.


Post is derivative of an original work I created on 22 August 2013 at 9pm.
[1] John Marshall, Marbury v. Madison

Wednesday, August 20, 2014

Unjust Law qua Law, contra lex injusta non est lex

I wrote this on 22 December 2013 at 12:15am. I am not sure I still agree with it—mostly because of the inclusion of analogical predication which I now view as a metaphysically weak absurdity—and I'm also not entirely sure Thomists would actually deny "law" analogically so predicated of "unjust law", but here we go:

Thomists would say that an unjust “law” is not a law at all since it cannot morally bind the conscience. But we still refer to this as a law, since we call it an unjust law. “Law” is predicated analogically of “unjust law,” but analogical predication acknowledges some similarity in distinct essences.
 
Law primarily binds in the conscience of the rational persons for whom it has been promulgated, since law expresses a rational ordinance and intention of the legislator and the rational binds the rational. But law binds the entire human person, and since man is a composite of body and soul, the law must also bind the body. It is the bodily binding element which an unjust law binds, since those who enforce the law will often continue to enforce unjust laws and inflict bodily punishments upon those who disobey them.
 
An unjust law has the analogically predicated denotation “law” insofar as such ordinance meets the formal requirements set by the legislator for a law to obtain binding force. This is a formal law which has formally binding force. A formal law can be just or unjust, since both kinds are able to meet the formal requirements for an ordinance to be “law.”
 
It is therefore unfitting to say that a formal law, although unjust, is altogether “not a law at all.” Insofar as it meets the requirements set by a validly constituted legislator for legislative status the word “law” can be predicated of it, although analogically, and insofar as “law” can be predicated analogically of an unjust formal law it is a law, although not in the unqualified sense nor in the sense that a just formal law is a law.