Showing posts with label Federal law. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Federal law. Show all posts

Sunday, January 21, 2018

The Night Before Shutdown

The Night Before Shutdown

‘Twas the night before Shutdown
When all through the Hill
Not a C.R. was passing,
Not even a bill.





"The Wall must be funded!
Keep cartels at bay!"
"It's racist!" yelled others;
"Make Mexico pay!"[i]


[i] Verse added 21 December 2018.





"The Wall must be funded!
Keep cartels at bay!"
"It's racist!" yelled others;
"Make Mexico pay!"
\\
 



With Old Guard, Hawks, Liberals,

And Tea Partisans,
Plus Party disjuncture,
No one had a plan.

“The Shutdown of Schumer”
“Trump’s fault!” pundits preached;
Fake News not the culprit,
No compromise reached.

The senators squabbled,
Exchanging much blame,
Each party was hoping
To p’litically gain.

Meanwhile the People,
Sound sleeping in bed,
Had visions of backpay
And furloughs instead.

Congressional leadership
From every angle,
Self-righteously shouted
With platforms entangled:
“Now! DACA, now! MAGA,
Now! Defense and Healthcare,
On! Airports, on! Highways

On! Bridges to Nowhere!”

 
With partisan gridlock
No funding was passed;
This government shutdown
Sure won’t be the last.



_______________________
20 January 2018, 4-5am; 6-7pm

Saturday, January 20, 2018

Of Retrograde Analogy and Conflicts of Logic

As a matter of constitutional law and federal statute, President Donald J. Trump has no conflicts of interest. This is not a statement of partisan sentiment. It is a statement of prima facie legal fact.

The concept of “conflict of interest” is not a category inherent in the nature of things; like the categories “personal property”, “real property”, and “fixed property” as legal categories of property created by law and applied to things in accordance with the legally defined meanings of such terms, the category “conflict of interest” is a legal category created by statue and subject to the definitional scope and limitations specified in such statutory text.

Like legal categories such as “contract” (think of the “Social Contract” theory advanced by Enlightenment legal philosophers) and dicta such as “clear and present danger” which have obtained usage far beyond their strict and original meaning, the original term and its context have given way to analogical predications of such terminology. This is all well and good, as both univocal and analogical prediction are natural operations of human language.

A problem arises, however, when a term commonly predicated analogically and thereby extended beyond its strict and original meaning is then predicated univocally of a subject capable of being predicated of univocally under the original meaning of the term wherefrom the analogical predication arose. Such abuse of logic, language, and law I have termed Retrograde Analogy.

Retrograde Analogy

When a conceptual category is abstracted from phenomena­—or, in the case at hand, defined by statute—and is assigned a term (e.g. “conflict of interest”), such assigned term is univocally predicable of the phenomena from which such conceptual category is abstracted. If the assigned term is applied to a similar yet distinct conceptual category, the term is predicated analogically of the differentiated conceptual category.

At this point in the logical flow of language, the term as originally used has undergone a slight modification in meaning; while the new meaning of the term is not wholly unrelated, neither is it wholly identifiable therewith. Wherefore Aquinas calls such analogia (for a philosophical treatment of the logic of analogy, see The Logic of Mystery in the Concept of Analogy). Insofar as the original term has taken upon itself an analogical meaning, however, a new term has been created which is thereby non-predicable—at least univocally—of the original phenomena encompassed by the original conceptual category abstracted from the latter.

Insofar as the analogical term is predicable of phenomena categorically distinguished from phenomena univocally so predicated of, such analogical term has become a true term with all the linguistic and logical properties inherent therein. A distinct conceptual category has been created from the abstraction of the distinguished phenomena, and the analogical term qua term will naturally evolve (i.e. ‘morph’) into yet further terms predicable of phenomena distinguishable from the phenomena encompassed by the analogical predication of the original term.

In this process, a new analogical term is created from the analogical predication of the original analogical term qua term; this is the process of linguistic conceptual development, the means whereby money was analogically predicated of Monopoly money, which in due course became analogically predicable of worthless compensation generally, and which may become analogically predicable of a fourth as yet uncreated conceptual category of phenomena. The linear progression of linguistic development constitutes a 1-way street as it were (to analogically predicate of the term univocally predicable of a category of municipal infrastructure [let the record reflect that the term retrograde analogy is itself an analogical predication of the term “retrograde”, which is itself univocally predicable of moving geometrical objects, not conceptual categories of law or logic]).

The forward movement of language is as natural a property of verbal communication as verbal communication itself is of human nature. The perversion of speech consists in the systematic attempt to overrule the linearly forward-moving property of linguistic development by the intentional introduction to the phenomena encompassed by a preceding conceptual category the analogically predicable term derived therefrom—retrograde analogical predication that contravenes the very nature of language. To univocally predicate a term of analogically related phenomena constitutes a high crime and misdemeanor against the very concept of language; if Retrograde Analogy escapes conviction in the Court of Public Discourse, such acquittal shall constitute the death of the linguistic rule of law and the birth of predicational mob rule.
 
Conflicts of Logic

To cite the venerable authority Black’s Law Dictionary—regularly cited by Federal Courts as quasi-prima facie evidence of the authentic meaning of legal terms—a “conflict of interest” is a  

[t]erm used in connection with public officials and fiduciaries and their relationship to matters of private interest or gain to them. Ethical problems connected therewith are covered by statues in most jurisdictions and by federal statutes on the federal level. Generally, when used to suggest disqualification of a public official from performing his sworn duty, [the] term “conflict of interest” refers to a clash between public interest and the private pecuniary interest of the individual concerned.[1]

Trump is alleged to have business holdings that constitute a conflict of interest with his current constitutional office of President of the United States, an office created by the U.S. Constitution in Article II, Section I, in contradistinction to an office created under the U.S. Constitution’s grant of legal authority, such as the office of the Secretary of State, an office created under the revised constitution by Act of Congress on July 27, 1789 as the “Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs”[2] and whose occupant is “appointed in consequence of this act”[3]. The distinction is crucial for the matter at hand.

Qualifications (or disqualifications) cannot be imposed by statute upon offices created by the Constitution, since the statues themselves are created by means of legislative power derived from Article I, and since a lower law cannot contradict a higher, it would be logically improper for a statute (a lower law) to contradict the Constitution (a higher law) by imposing further qualifications not decreed by the Constitution itself. By contrast, offices created under the constitution are subject to the statutory imposition of whatever qualifications the Congress deems appropriate—insofar as these do not themselves contravene the Constitution itself—for both office and statute are on juridically equal constitutional footing qua creatures of the Constitution. An office created by the Constitution, however, is not a creature of the Constitution, but constitutes a constituent part of the Constitution itself. Consequently, the imposition of further qualifications for the office holder to validly hold his office can be accomplished solely through the procedure of constitutional amendment defined in Article V.

Since such an allegation is necessarily understood as an allegation of fact in violation of statutory law, it is improper to impose any non-legal predication—analogical or otherwise—upon such term in the legal context of such allegation, and the legal meaning of the term “conflict of interest” by right ought to be predicated thereof. But Trump’s alleged conflicts of interest are non-existent by the body of statutory law under which such term obtains legal meaning and injunctive force. Wherefore Trump’s alleged conflicts of interest are non-existent insofar as the term “conflict of interest” is understood as a univocally predicable term of juridical art.

Legal terms acquire legal meaning solely through the legislative-constitutional context under which such terms originally acquired substantive content. In the case before us, the original legal meaning is patently inapplicable. Wherefore I declare that Trump has no conflicts of interest under the American system of federal constitutional law. Rather, his legion of legally illiterate detractors have manifested a conflict of logic neither present in the law of the land nor in the nature of things; in the absence of legal fact they have created a legal fiction in blatant contravention of constitutional law and linguistic logic: Retrograde Analogy.



Original idea Feb 6, 2017, 9:55am
Blogpost started Feb 14, 2017, 8:15pm.
Continued Jul 9, 2017, 9:15pm.
 
[1] Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th Edition, pg. 271
[3] Ibid., Section 4

Monday, September 7, 2015

Promulgation, "ignorantia juris non excusat", & Conformity to Reality

I’ve been thinking about the requirements for “just law” recently. One, of course, is promulgation, since without promulgation the spirit of the law­­­­—the intention of the legislator, the truest law—cannot be known to those upon whom it enjoins.[1] But what exactly renders “promulgation” valid, effective, just, etc.? This requires a further level of philosophical investigation, one which I will now endeavor upon at least preliminarily.
 
It seems that “just law” must conform to reality. Ignoring the epistemological problems inherent in this thesis, and dismissing for the present a host of post-Scholastic objections that could be raised against the tenability of “reality” serving as a valid criterion for the law, let us accept this thesis, not so much qua thesis, but for now at least, qua premise of the unfolding argument. “Just law” must conform to reality.
 
This necessitates that any criterion for the law must also conform to reality. Therefore, as we sketched briefly above, promulgation—a necessary prerequisite for “just law”—must conform to reality.
 
Now it occurs to me that most of our laws in the United States, if not those in every self-respecting sovereign nation-state, do not conform to reality in this respect. In the United States, the dictum “ignorance of the law is no excuse” {ignorantia juris non excusat}[2] is often cited as dogmatic tenet of due process, and therefore of public justice. But can this principle of trial law serve as anything more than a legal fiction for the convenience of our courts? Does this principle actually conform to reality? In other words, is ignorance of the law a valid excuse?
 
I should say it is. In a simpler time before the advent of the omni-competent regulative superstructure of the Sovereign State, it was almost possible for the educated person to know all the laws. In the customary legal systems of the classical world, one learned the law by living in society; legally-binding customs (a notion foreign to individualistic Americans) were passed down naturally and socially, thereby precluding the invocation of “ignorance” as a valid excuse.[3] Later, the codifications of the continental civil law made the law accessible to the upper classes at least, and their size and scope were somewhat restricted. In England, too, the principles of common law were able to be mastered by the intelligent barrister, anyway, and so in both legal systems it was a reasonably doable dictum, that “ignorance of the law is no excuse”. But this changed within the ever-expanding competencies and legal framework of the Sovereign State in the face of the ever-increasing complexities of the modern age.
 
I will take as an example illustrative of my argument and applicable to many other jurisdictions the situation of Federal criminal law in the United States. The United States Code (U.S.C.) is at the time of writing 52 titles, with most if not all of those spanning multiple volumes and with more titles planned. The United States Statutes-at-Large—the legally admissible evidence of law,[4] used to challenge the non-positive[5] U.S.C., which is merely  prima facie evidence of the law in effect[6]—is larger still, in publication since the infancy of the Republic and sometimes including provisions that the Office of the Law Revision Counsel has elected to leave out of the U.S.C., adding further complication in spreading knowledge of the law. The United States Department of Justice, among others, has attempted to accurately calculate the number of crimes contained throughout the U.S.C and has not even been able to render an accurate count[7] (Title 18, Crimes and Criminal Procedure, is not the only place where crimes are stipulated). If the governmental instrument of legal enforcement is not able to even provide an accurate count of total federal crimes—let alone draw up a comprehensive list by subject matter of all crimes currently ‘in force’—then how, might I ask, does it conform to reality to decree that “ignorance of the law is no excuse” in a criminal proceeding when the very agency tasked with prosecution is unaware of the total number and therefore scope of criminalized subject matter? Quite simply, there are currently too many Federal crimes for the average citizen, the citizen who is procedurally precluded from invoking ignorance of the law as an extenuating factor.
 
“Ignorance of the law is no excuse”, it might be objected, is mandated by the necessities of criminal law, for otherwise every defendant would invoke the opposite of such principle and be thereby acquitted. This is a valid objection, and I concur that many shrewd defenses could be constructed thereby. But this objection does not address whether a fundamental principle of law, that law must conform to reality, is honored by the existence of this principle. I offer a supplementary principle—Prosecutorial convenience is no excuse for the contravention of reality. The culture of “having it on the books” so that when-and-if there is ever use for an obscure criminal provision, it exists for the prosecutor’s convenience and discretion (if the Justice Department is even cognizant of its existence in the first place) contravenes the real state of legal knowledge of almost all criminal defendants, and through no fault of their own, since the Justice Department does not even know of all crimes. Simply “having it on the books” does not fulfill the goal of promulgation, that the law be made known publicly. This practice produces today's climate of legal knowledge and erects the rule of law as an esoteric instrument of total power thinly veiled.
 
The solution to this crisis is the repeal of many criminal laws, not the evermore resounding parroting of the obsolete principle “ignorance of the law is no excuse”. In the last analysis, when the leviathan of the modern legal complex is judged against the reality of the average subject upon whom such law is claimed to enjoin, the principle “ignorance of the law is no excuse” falls flat as a contravention of reality and therefore of justice. The principle may stand in the context of a manageable legal corpus, but advocating the feasibility of such a sizable reduction on the part of the Sovereign State is an equally extravagant contravention of reality. A just legal framework must respect both the legitimate complexities of the modern order and the non-virtuosic abilities of the average citizen. Wherefore “ignorance of the law” is an excuse; 21st century legal philosophers must craft an alternative theory that respects contemporary legal reality, thereby rendering the law in conformity with reality and reinstating its full morally-binding character as “just law”.
 
 
REVISED 17 SEPTEMBER 2015 (Constitution Day and Citizenship Day, cf. 36 U.S.C. 106), 11:50PM PDT


[2] Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th Edition, pg. 672.
[3] Wikipedia contributors, "Ignorantia juris non excusat", Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia,https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Ignorantia_juris_non_excusat&oldid=680621004, accessed 12 September 2015. 
[5] Cf. Office of the Law Revision Counsel, “Positive Law Codification”, http://uscode.house.gov/codification/legislation.shtml.
[7] Gary Fields & John r. Emshwiller, “Many Failed Efforts to Count Nation’s Federal Criminal Laws”, The Wall Street Journal, July 23, 2011, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304319804576389601079728920, accessed 8 September 2015.